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THE POLITICS OF HOUSING
DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE
JAMES H. KLEIN*
Editor's Note:
This Article details the mechanics of a university course on the Politics
of Urban Justice. Although it is not our general policy to publish this
type of syllabus, we hope that the information provided herein will be
helpful to those wishing to gain a better understanding of the political
context in which housing dispute resolution takes place.
I. THE PROBLEM
Housing conflicts constitute a fundamental concern of the American
legal system. Disputes over housing comprise a large segment of urban
court caseloads.I Community housing concerns deepen as urban housing
stocks decline. Policy-makers, responding to these concerns, enact new
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Loyola University of Chicago; J.D., Temple
University, 1967; Ph.D., Princeton University, 1972.
I. In the Forceable Entry and Detainer Court of the First Municipal District of the Cook
County Circuit Court (the City of Chicago) 64,748 eviction suits were filed in 1977, 97% of
which sought evictions from residential premises. S.J. MANSFIELD, JUDGMENT LANDLORD: A
STUD OF EVICTION COURT IN CHICAGO 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MANSFIELD]. This
represents about 26% of all civil suits filed in the First Municipal District. There were
23,606 cases pending in the Housing Court of the Cook County Circuit Court at the end of
1977. This represents about 7% of all civil and criminal cases pending in the entire circuit.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, 1977 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR
THE CIRCUI T COURT OF COOK COUNTY (1978).
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laws which show little regard for the practical problems confronting
courts struggling to translate these legislative goals into policy outcomes.
In the meantime, the housing crisis worsens and public confidence in the
legal system declines.'
The problems of housing dispute resolution are ripe for serious study
by those who wish to learn about the legal process. The legal and
political context in which the urban justice system operates must be
studied to achieve any meaningful understanding of the system. Chicago
is selected as a case study. At the outset, one must examine the structure
of the local court system, emphasizing the functions of its various courts.
The Circuit Court of Cook County's division into separate units
specializing in certain kinds of cases is typical of bureaucratic urban
court organization. The complexities of the urban justice system and the
broad range of important issues which the local judiciary decides can
only be appreciated if this organization is considered.
In addition, an understanding of the environmental influences on local
judicial policy-making is necessary. These influences are of two types:
forces arising within the local political environment, and external factors
working against local pressures. It is assumed that the policy outcomes of
urban justice systems result from particular local dynamics and from the
broader constraints of the legal system.' Consequently, a gap may occur
between policy goals embodied in statutory and case law, and policy
outcomes embodied in court decisions and their impact. This gap may
best be explained in terms of the dominant local environmental pressures
on the justice system.
Dominant factors might include examples of the manner in which
local enforcement authorities fix judicial agendas in criminal and some
civil matters; the effect of home-rule provisions on the legal framework
applicable to certain kinds of controversies, especially those asking
judges to monitor local elites and rules of the political games; the effect
on judicial values of local control of judicial selection; and the im-
portance of locally accepted norms about the meaning of justice.
2. See R. HARRIS, JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA 13
(1970); W.G. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURO, URBAN HOUSING POLICY 2 (1975). At least one
public interest law group in Chicago is publicly contemplating a suit against Housing Court
in Cook County for its alleged failure to function according to Illinois law. Sussman, One
May Sue Housing Court, Uptown News, Jan. 16, 1979, at 3. For the view that there may
not be a real crisis, see E. BANFIELD, THE UNIIEAVENLY CITY: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF
OUR URBAN CRISIS (1968).
3. See H. JACOB. URBAN JUSTICE: LAW AND ORDER IN AMERICAN CITIES 6 (1973); J.R.
KLONOSKI & R.I. MENDELSOHN, THE POLITICS OF LOCAL JUSTICE (1970).
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Examples of external factors restraining local dominance include sub-
stantive law, appellate processes, and national political culture.4
The third and core area to be examined in any study of the urban
justice system treats selected aspects of criminal and civil justice. By
looking at certain criminal justice policies such as police accountability,
internal and external, prosecution and defense of indigents, sentencing,
and community corrections, one may realize the nature and full extent of
the problems involved. To facilitate this, there must be a three-fold
analysis: describing specific policy outcomes, explaining the
bureaucratic and political forces producing policy, and evaluating policy
in light of various standards of justice.
Greater stress should be placed on civil justice rather than criminal
justice issues, however, because most people are less familiar with the
impact of civil law on the quality of life. Housing policy is an area of
basic importance in civil law.I
Finally, analysis should be focused upon trends toward non-
adjudicative alternatives for allocating urban justice. While the
"alternative" movement is not theoretically or practically limited to
urban areas, stress on urban justice systems has prompted most of the
experimentation occurring in the United States.6 The concept of the
"neighborhood justice center," for example, illustrates this trend.7 Its
role is more fully described below.'
There is a lack of up-to-date materials on the range of policy issues
that might be treated when studying urban justice. The experiences of the
City of Chicago, however, provide a rich and accessible source of data
for developing relevant materials. The electronic medium of video-tape
provides a means of gathering and organizing that data for presentation.
Participants in local legal processes can be interviewed, their com-
ments recorded, and the interviews edited into coherent programs that
may be integrated into distinct topical areas. Comments can be
illustrated and reinforced with pictorial and graphic material, inserted
4. See JACOB,supra note 3, at 10.
5. Id. at 6-24.
6. See D.E. AARONSON, B. HOFF, P. JASZI, N.N. KITTRIE & D. SAARI, THE NEW JUSTICE:
ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION (1977); E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR
& E. SCHV'WARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS A SURVEY OF DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL
CASES (1977); American Bar Association, Report on the National Conference on Minor
Disputes Resolution (1977).
7. See D. McGILLIS & J. MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
POTENTIAL MODELS 117-35 (1977).
8. Id. at 25-31.
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after the interview and before play-back, to create an impact that most
guest speakers cannot achieve. Furthermore, this avoids the problems
accompanying attempts to schedule busy professionals.
Interviews were held and video-taped with more than twenty par-
ticipants in the Chicago urban justice process in 1977-78. Interviewees
included attorneys, judges, litigants and administrators. Each interview
covered a broad range of relevant topics. Material pertaining to specific
subjects from the different interviews was then edited into a series of
individual programs. 9
In this way, several programs were developed. Each program exposes
the viewer to unique material with an impact only the electronic media
are capable of generating. Additionally, study guides were developed to
accompany and reinforce each program. Use of the guides requires that
viewers do more than passively watch.
Most of the tapes focus on housing problems and the way urban courts
influence housing policy. Additionally, one tape examines non-judicial
dispute resolution processes as an alternative approach to various aspects
of housing justice.
II. HOUSING DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. The Political and Economic Context
Housing dispute resolution is only one aspect of housing policy.
Understanding the policy outcomes of dispute resolution processes
requires attention to both political and economic factors.
A logical starting point is to conceptualize the "housing problem" in
terms of a gap between housing ideals and realities. The ideal of
"decent" housing for all Americans, as embodied in federal policy, is a
readily acceptable notion.I Some sense of the gap emerges by reviewing
recent findings about housing "adequacy." The measures of adequacy
used in these studies indicated the failure to achieve the national goal of
"decent" housing. "
9. The video project was funded through a grant to Loyola University from the Andrew
W. Mellon Foundation. The entire series of videotapes are available from the Media
Services Department of Loyola University of Chicago.
10. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME (1968). Congress
stated the basic goal of national housing policy to be "the realization as soon as feasible of
the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American fam-
ily. ... " Housing Act of 1949, § 12,42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1978).
11. See J. HERON, HOUSING PROBLEMS IN ILLINOIS (1978); BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT
OF COMMERCE 1 (1970); CENSUS OF HOUSING: UNITED STATES SUMMARY (1972).
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Another index of the gap is to contrast the perceptions of community
organizers and residents who live and work in declining city neigh-
borhoods with views expressed by governmental officials having
responsibilities in the area. Officials suggest that things are getting
better, at least within the limits of what is feasible. Feasibility is defined
by the suggestion that the "poor will always be with us." Official op-
timism contrasts sharply with the grassroots perceptions that the urban
housing stock, at least in some neighborhoods, is getting worse instead of
better. 2
The significance of the problem becomes more concrete by tracing the
consequences of housing decline. These consequences include not only
miserable living conditions, but also destructive secondary effects on the
quality of urban life.I3
As housing declines, long-time residents who care about their
neighborhood and neighbors become frightened and flee. Newcomers in
search of cheap housing take their places. The neighborhood, once a
place of familiarity and security, becomes a space for anonymity and
fear. Such conditions are a ripe breeding ground for crime.
Physical and sociological changes trigger economic devastation. At the
same time, economic devastation fosters physical and sociological
changes. Capital no longer is in the neighborhood. Physical repairs
become too risky. Disinvestment by banks, business and insurance
companies (redlining) hastens the decline.
The political complexity of the housing problem becomes evident by
surveying various interpretations of its causes. Three overlapping
conceptual frameworks of causal explanation emerge: socio-cultural,
economic and class conflict.
The socio-cultural explanation stresses the consequences of ethnic and
economic neighborhood integration. Some commentators view the
intrusion of alien races and cultures into the community as the cause of
neighborhood decline. "Intruders" frighten established residents into
leaving and trigger the slide toward slums. Intruders also may be
depicted as destructive of the physical and social environment because of
unsanitary living habits or unconventional behavior.
The economic explanation has three variations. One version stresses
the problem of inadequate capital to sustain decent housing. Capital is
scarce because of tenants' inability to pay rents sufficient to finance
12. Videotaped pictures of deteriorating conditions underscore these perceptions.
J. Klein, Housing Ideals v. Realities in Chicago: The Case of Uptown (1978) (videotape).
13. R.F. MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING (1969).
1979]
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adequate maintenance and generate return on investments. The presence
of many marginal landlords, who either cannot afford or lack the know-
how to properly manage property, reinforces the problem.
A second version of the economic interpretation blames avaricious
landlords for neighborhood decline. Slumlords "milk" buildings by
draining capital from rental property in order to reap huge short-term
profits.
These two versions of the economic interpretation suggest a third
perspective. Neighborhoods in decline are caught in the midst of a
dilemma stemming from a struggle between the poor and the middle-
class concerning the future of the city or important parts of it. This class
conflict results in a stalemate and governmental inability to develop
effective policies to promote decent housing for all.
There are five ways to identify public policy failures. First, middle-
class interests point to policies which attract "bad" people to neigh-
borhoods struggling for stability. De-tox centers, methadone clinics,
halfway houses, shelters for various kinds of "down and outers," and
low-income housing are examples of policy labeled as destructive.
From the perspective of lower-income persons' interests, the major
fault of public policy is failure to provide an economic base for decent
neighborhoods. Unemployment, inadequate housing subsidies, and the
failure to enforce anti-redlining laws put decent housing beyond the
reach of many persons.
A third area of class conflict over public policy concerns land use and
planning policy. While middle-class interests promote projects which
attract business or institutional development, at the same time they
destroy blighted areas. Displaced lower-income groups bitterly resent
such development. Concurrently, zoning ordinances permitting the
establishment of rowdy bars, hangouts, adult bookstores or other
establishments which offend middle-class sensibilities, appeal to the
under- or unemployed, and encourage class feuds.
Both middle-class and lower-income interests service delivery policies
as a cause of neighborhood decline. All citizens view inadequate police,
fire and sanitation services as destructive.
Finally, a policy area where class interests both converge and diverge
concerns the processing of housing disputes by the legal system. There
seems to be a widespread consensus that the legal system fails to resolve
disputes in ways which effectively promote "decent" housing. There is
disagreement over the precise nature of this failure, but loss of con-
fidence in the legal process is widespread.
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B. Urban Legal Systems and Housing Disputes
Building Code Enforcement
Formerly, cases applying municipal ordinances governing the con-
struction and maintenance of residential buildings were matters of public
law involving the application of police power to protect public health and
welfare. However, as a practical matter, in many cases code enforcement
is merely one component in a conflict between property owners and other
private citizens affected by the condition of the property.
The theoretical policy objective of a building code is decent housing."
The definition of housing decency varies according to the standards
enacted in the local code. The Chicago housing stock is the beneficiary of
two statutory frameworks. The building code enacted by the City of
Chicago is one of the most stringent in the nation." Home rule permits
the city to provide a variety of sanctions for code enforcement.
Moreover, Illinois has enacted additional provisions making it a crime to
manage housing in an unsafe condition.16
While a few critics of the housing dispute resolution process in
Chicago blame its failings on certain statutory loopholes, the majority
condemn the system because of perceived inefficiencies in the en-
forcement process. To many, the process amounts to little more than a
bureaucratic game, ultimately leading to the destruction rather than the
preservation of decent housing. "
Many conventional critics understate the dilemma which housing
economics impose on code enforcers. Truly stringent code enforcement,
in the context of present economic realities, may actually increase rates
of abandonment and stimulate new slums. Furthermore, bureaucratic
and judicial reluctance to enforce the code can be exploited by slumlords
thereby leading to the same net result: slums.
14. It is a concrete expression of the ideals expressed by Congress. Housing Act of 1954,
42 U.S.C. § 1451 (1978); Housing Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (1978). Federal pressure
on state and local government to use police power to achieve this goal resulted in the policy
objectives underlying housing codes. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes,
78 H ARv L. REV 801,803 (1965).
15. Chicago, Ill., Building Code; e.g., chapter 39-3 provides that each day a violation
occurs constitutes a separate and distinct offense for which a fine of up to $200 may be
imposed.
16. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-5.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
17. See J. Klein, The Building Code and Slums in Chicago: Effective Law Enforcement
or Bureaucratic Games? (1978) (videotape).
19791
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Conventional critics condemn failures in the enforcement process at
all three levels: detection, prosecution and adjudication. Indeed,
questions about the allocation of resources to these functions, the ad-
ministration of available resources, and the use of discretion by officials
can be legitimately raised.
The manner in which the Chicago Department of Buildings exercises
its responsibility to detect code violations raises many issues. While the
Building Department requires regular inspections, they do not always
occur. When they do, the inspections are not always adequate. Many
inspectors are not competent and utilize their authority in an arbitrary
and dishonest manner. When tenants or abutting residents report
violations, the department takes unreasonably long to respond. 8 In-
ternal department procedures such as adminstrative hearings before a
"compliance board," designed to encourage compliance add un-
necessarily to this delay.
Even stronger criticism is reserved for the prosecutorial function in the
enforcement ladder. In fact, the gap between community perceptions
and official views about the effectiveness of the city's corporation
counsel is so wide that the corporate counsel office prohibits on-camera
staff-attorney interviews. Repeated and severe confrontations have
occurred between community organizers and the corporation counsel;
and the counsel's office has become increasingly defensive. Con-
sequently, many criticisms go unanswered.
The assignment of only a few staff attorneys to the extremely heavy
caseload is unrealistic, and an inadequate recognition of the seriousness
of the urban housing crisis. There is also excessive lag-time between
referral to the corporation counsel and the initiation of prosecution. The
city's attorneys typically come to court unprepared to press for en-
forcement, question the basis for landlords' repeated motions for
continuances, consolidate cases against repeat offenders, effectively
present evidence of non-compliance, seek stiff penalties against obvious
slumlords, cooperate with neighborhood organizations, or to seek the
creation of receiverships for salvageable buildings.
In contrast, the Cook County State's Attorney, who initiates
prosecutions under the state's Criminal Housing Management Act, 9 has
successfully deflected much criticism to other points in the system. The
Act has limited reach; it applies only to code violations creating clear,
18. The city's own inspectors report violations, yet there is usually a three- to six-month
delay between detection and referral to the city's corporation counsel.
19. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-5.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
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imminent and life-threatening dangers. Most cases come to the state's
attorney only after a series of protracted proceedings and delays while
the case was in the hands of the corporation counsel. Furthermore, it is
generally perceived that the judicial failure to impose criminal sanctions
in these cases does not stem from lack of vigorous prosecution by the
state's attorney. Finally, only a fraction of all code enforcement cases
fall within the state's attorney's jurisdiction largely because of the way in
which the statute has been drafted and interpreted. Consequently, critics
must look elsewhere for primary scapegoats. Many turn to the courts.
The Housing Court in Chicago consists of six courtrooms that are part
of the Cook County Circuit Court. Each court has specialized functions
according to geographic areas and types of code violations. One handles
all demolition cases brought by the city which usually have already
extended for years because of prior proceedings. These cases have
resulted only in the continuing demise and eventual abandonment of
buildings.
Housing Court possesses all the legal and equitable powers of courts of
general jurisdiction in the Illinois unified system. The community voices
strong concern over the apparent reluctance of the court to use its power
against code violators. Some concerns focus on the problem of delay
once proceedings have begun,2" and the apparent unwillingness of
housing court judges to use the full panoply of coercive powers at their
disposal to induce compliance. 21
Perceived shortcomings in detecting, prosecuting and adjudicating
code violations provoke an array of suggested reforms, 22 yet the ef-
fectiveness of enforcing housing codes to promote decent housing is not
clear. Legislative changes in the state's Criminal Housing Management
Act also would be necessary to close certain loopholes and widen the
range of the state's attorney's jurisdiction. However, given the reluc-
20. Delays may be inherent in the legal process, resulting from service of process
problems, difficulties in acquiring proper jurisdiction over defendant landlords, and even
in identifying the proper defendant. Factors within the court's control such as its con-
tinuance policy also contribute to unnecessary delays. The court is too willing to grant
continuances on insufficient evidence that landlords are making good faith efforts to bring
their buildings into compliance.
21. E.g., fines are seldom imposed, even though they are routinely sought against land-
lords who drag their cases on endlessly. Judges rarely issue contempt citations even where
landlords show their obvious disregard for the court's orders to repair. Yet, query whether
the use of stiff sanctions will bring about greater compliance.
22. See generally Dick & Pfarr, Detroit Housing Code Enforcement and Community
Renewal: A Study in Futility, 3 PROSPECTUs 61 (1969).
1979]
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tance of judges to impose only token sentences such changes may not be
worth fighting for, especially since the political influence of real estate
interests in the legislature would be very difficult to overcome.
Alternative methods to achieve housing goals include grassroots action
aimed at putting more community pressure on legal officials for more
aggressive detection activities, or more vigorous prosecution, or less
tolerant judicial behavior. Given the case by case nature of the legal
process and the slim organizational resources of most community
organizations, the success of such activities is improbable. Before code
enforcement can be made more effective, the economic dilemmas
inherent in such enforcement must be addressed. For example, strict
enforcement produces abandonment and lax enforcement permits the
inevitable slide toward demolition. To resolve this dilemma officials
must decide whether code standards should be lowered to more
"practical" levels, or be bifurcated; high standards for good neigh-
borhoods and low standards for marginal areas. 23 While code en-
forcement thereby becomes enforceable in economic terms, it may result
in decent housing for only the middle class. On the other hand,
uniformly high codes may be made "practical" through government
subsidies to the housing market, supplemented with regulatory controls
assuring that landlords use subsidies to maintain their buildings in
compliance.24 But, subsidies may not be politically feasible given general
taxpayer resistance to increasing tax burdens, and growing middle-class
resistance to subsidy programs that bring "undesirables" into their
neighborhoods.25
The difficulty with housing code enforcement as a solution to the
housing problem may lie not in the perceived bureaucratic inefficiencies
and petty corruptions in the legal process. Rather, the major obstacle to
solutions may be class divisions about housing policy which undercut any
comprehensive approach. These divisions become even more apparent in
another aspect of housing dispute resolution: eviction court.
23. For a complete discussion of various housing code approaches, see Landman,
Flexible Housing Code-The Mystique of the Single Standard: A Critical Analysis and
Comparison of Model and Selected Housing Codes Leading to the Development of a
ProposedModelFlexible Code, 18 How. L. J. 251 (1974).
24. Cf. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 849-59
(1965) (discussing possible methods of alleviating market impediments to rehabilitation,
coupled with strict code enforcement to maintain compliance).
25. See I. WELFELD, R. MUTH, H. WEHNER, & J. WEICHER, PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSINO AND
URBAN RENEWAL 11(1974).
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C. Tenant Remedies in Evictions
Landlord and tenant interests clash in the Forceable Entry and
Detainer Court of the Cook County Circuit Court. Historically, the
remedial objectives of eviction court proceedings have given landlords
control over their property in the event of a tenant's failure to pay rent.
In recent years, however, doctrinal changes in the law have introduced
other goals.
The development of the warranty of habitability26 and other tenant
defenses to an eviction can be rationalized, in part, as judicial
recognition of the social importance of decent housing.2 7 By giving
tenants the warranty defense, courts theoretically provide an incentive to
landlords to maintain rented premises up to some standard of
habitability, or, alternatively, an incentive to tenants to divert rent into
maintenance of the premises. 2 Actual policy outcomes, however, at least
in Cook County, have fallen far short of the objective of giving tenants
greater leverage in the struggle for decent housing. The chief reason for
this failure is the way in which the Forceable Entry and Detainer Court
proceedings have virtually ignored the habitability doctrine and other
tenant remedies. Critics go so far as to claim that a presumption in favor
of landlords dominates the proceedings in eviction court, thereby
negating whatever policy in favor of decent housing has evolved in legal
doctrine."
A group of attorneys and law students have assumed the task of
demonstrating this presumption. Following two years of systematic court
watching, they assembled empirical data illustrating that landlords win in
eviction court more than eighty percent of the time. Winning bears no
statistical relationship to the tenant's appearance or failure to appear,
the assertion or waiver of defenses, or the nature of the defenses
asserted. Tenants attempting to claim the warranty of habitability
defense have the same high probability of losing as tenants claiming that
26. The Illinois Supreme Court first recognized the defense in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little,
50 11L. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972). Subsequent cases have expanded the doctrine. See,
e.g., Fisher v. Holt, 52 Ill. App. 3d 164, 367 N.E.2d 370 (1977); South Austin Realty Assoc.
v. Sombright, 47 Ill. App. 3d 89, 361 N.E.2d 795 (1977); Richardson v. Wilson, 46 111. App.
3d 622, 361 N.E.2d 110 (1977); Peoria Housing Auth. v. Sanders, 54 Ill. 2d 478, 298
N.E.2d 173 (1973).
27. See generally Blumberg & Robbins, Beyond URLTR: A Program of Achieving Real
Tenant Goals, I I HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,7-9 (1976).
28. S. BURGHARDT, TENANTS AND THE URBAN HoUSING CRISIS (1972).
29. See, e.g., MANSFIELD,Supra note 1.
1979)
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their rent was paid or asserting some technical defense based on
inadequate notice or service. Even the presence of counsel on tenants'
behalf had little bearing on their chance of winning. 0
These empirical findings raise serious questions about the possibility
of a systematic bias in favor of landlords, resulting in the avoidance of
legally recognized tenant remedies. Alternative explanations for so
pronounced a pattern are hard to identify.
Difficulties with the court increase in light of the court watchers'
report of irregularities which occurred in their presence. The court
regularly denied jury trials even though guaranteed by statute; and in-
deed, the court granted jury trials only when a defendant obtained
mandamus to that effect from the Illinois Supreme Court. The court
disposed of large numbers of cases en masse on the landlord's
unquestioned assurance that tenants were not present; admitted hearsay
evidence obtained over the telephone from absent landlords by their
attorneys in the midst of the proceedings; and greeted tenants asserting
habitability defenses with the admonition that if the apartment was really
that bad, why would the tenant want to continue living there? I,
No one has publicly voiced a persuasive defense of the situation in
eviction court. While arguments can be made that landlords bear the
entire brunt of legal liability in housing court (even if they are not always
causally responsible for havoc brought by destructive tenants), and that
in some cases the thirty-day process for evicting destructive tenants seems
too long, neither contention justifies the wholesale disregard of tenant
legal defenses. Moreover, the claim that most tenants sued in eviction
court have not paid their rent also misses the mark; the habitability
doctrine is meant as a defense to non-payment. In a more generous light,
perhaps this contention is acutally a claim that most tenants are in
eviction court because they cannot or will not pay the rent. The
protection of tenants living beyond their ability or willingness to pay is
obviously not the intent of tenant defenses; it thus appears that the
economic realities of the housing marketplace once again present a
practical barrier to meaningful application of legal principle to fact. If
the warranty of habitability doctrine is taken seriously only in the context
of middle-class housing disputes this implies a class-based standard of
justice. Even if most tenants in eviction court are unable or unwilling to
pay the rent, the function of the justice system is to exercise due process
to reasonably discriminate between them and those entitled to the
30. Id.
31. See J. Klein, Eviction Court in Chicago: Judgment Landlord (1978) (videotape).
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defense.
Critics of the eviction court emphasize the need for structural reforms
to solve the court's problems." The chief failing they identify is that only
two judges, sitting on a part-time basis, are responsible for hearing more
than 64,000 eviction cases a year in the City of Chicago. This represents
one-fourth of the city's civil caseload to which less than five percent of
the available judicial resources are assigned." Under such pressures, a
presumption working in favor of landlords is practically inevitable.
Hence, the structural critics call for, among other things, more judges,
more courtrooms, and longer calls."'
Other critics see more fundamental obstacles impeding meaningful
changes necessary to achieve decent housing and equitable resolution of
landlord-tenant disputes. First, they perceive a severe imbalance of
power between landlords and tenants that permits landlords to frustrate
mere structural reforms in eviction court. They claim, for example, that
the legal process inevitably handicaps poor tenants when it comes to
proof of such things as payment of rent. The difficulties accompanying
the lack of rent receipts in poor neighborhoods and landlord un-
willingness to formally acknowledge tenants' use of rent money to repair
the premises" exacerbate the problem.
Critics also cite the landlords' power to evict outside the legal process
as a second problem. Until recently, the Chicago police, if called to the
scene, treated "illegal" or "strongarm" evictions, or "lockouts," as
civil matters in which they had no legitimate jurisdiction. A tenant's only
recourse was to the civil courts. In the meantime, tenants must locate
new shelter; therefore, from a tenant's perspective, a civil suit to regain
possession is a waste of time, useful only to reclaim personal property
left behind. Under a new city ordinance, illegal evictions are a criminal
offense.36 Police regulations, however, do not authorize arrests. Rather,
police refer evicted tenants to the misdemeanor court where they may
swear out a complaint. In the meantime, tenants are still literally out in
the cold. Structural reforms, in other words, do not deter landlords
intent upon removing tenants from the premises.
32.Id.
33. MANSFIELD,Supra note 1.
34. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMM. ON HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT LAW, URBAN HOUSING COURTS AND LANDLORD-TENANT JUSTICE: NATIONAL
MODELS AND EXPERIENCE (1977).
35. See J. Klein, Eviction Court in Chicago: Judgment Landlord (1978) (videotape).
36. CHICAGO, ILL, ORDINANCES. Chap. 193 -1.5 (1978).
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Militant tenant groups call for self-help solution: rent strikes, building
seizures, armed tenant patrols, resulting in inevitable clashes with the
owners of property. Other community organizations search for more
moderate solutions. One such approach aims at reducing potential
conflict by fostering the mutual interests of landlords and tenants. Some
neighborhood organizations search for "good" landlords and "good"
tenants in order to bring them together. They may bolster these efforts
through various counseling programs which provide building
management advice for landlords and workshops to promote responsible
tenant behavior. On occasion, they may involve the organization in
efforts to mediate landlord-tenant disputes that arise. Systematic
mediation programs, however, are only beginning to develop; until they
do, the objective of providing decent housing in the context of dispute
resolution may be substantially frustrated by structural weaknesses in the
urban justice system and class antagonisms between landlords and
tenants.
D. Alternatives to Adjudication of Housing Disputes
A fully efficient system of resolving housing disputes in the context of
class and economic conflict may not be within easy reach. Formal
systems of adjudication which depend upon the application of general
legal principles, formulated without proper consideration of the
economic and political environment, may be especially inefficient.
Assuming that the legal system is responsive to dominant economic and
political interests, it will not apply formal legal norms in a manner
opposed to those interests. When the norms themselves threaten
dominant interests, the legal system will "neutralize" the norms. The
gap between legal formalism and real legal outcomes provides a measure
of the system's "inefficiency."
The system's inefficiencies go even further, however, because it fails to
resolve disputes; it merely processes them. The disputes may continue
over long periods or may recur repeatedly. Escalation of the conflict may
accompany the protracted and recurring nature of processed but
unresolved disputes. Endless "processing" may be one way of
neutralizing legal norms that run counter to dominant political or
economic values. The building code bureaucracy in Chicago seems to
follow this tactic. While the eviction court does not engage in protracted
processing of a case, it probably performs only minimal dispute
resolution functions. Because of this, large numbers of tenants never
submit themselves to its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the same landlords
may be repeatedly using the court to process the same kinds of disputes.
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In recent years, these and a variety of other shortcomings in the ability
of conventional legal processes to serve the needs of all citizens have led
to the search for alternative ways of resolving disputes. The "alternatives
movement" is exemplified in many ways. A common theme running
throughout much of the discussion, however, is the diversion of disputes
away from established adjudicatory proceedings." '
An example of the diversion approach which offers an especially
promising alternative in the area of housing dispute resolution is the
concept of neighborhood justice centers (NJC), which is a voluntary,
neighborhood-based process for resolving minor disputes through
mediation and arbitration.3" Although established NJC programs do not
incorporate each of the elements of this definition in precisely the same
manner, the differences which exist seem to be more of degree than of
kind."
The NJCs are voluntary in two senses. Submission of the dispute to the
NJC is at the discretion of both parties. Those NJCs with close ties to
formal legal processes may de-emphasize this element to the extent that
officials who divert cases to the NJC apply psychological and coercive
pressure on parties to use the NJC. To the extent that NJCs emphasize
compliance with resolution outcomes is also largely voluntary.
Mediation agreements are not legally binding. If an arbitration award is
entered, however, in conformity to operative arbitration rules, it has
legal effect upon confirmation by a court.
The NJCs are neighborhood-based. Many are physically located in the
neighborhoods they serve and maintain hours convenient to area
residents. More significantly, community people, both lay and
professionals, serve as the mediators and arbitrators. In almost all NJCs,
completion of a formal training program is a prerequisite. The emphasis,
however, is on drawing people from the community to resolve disputes
among their peers. Finally, some NJCs assign policy-making functions to
the boards representing various segments of their neighborhood.
37. See D. McGILLIS & J. MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF
POTENTIAL MODELS(1977).
38. See J. KLEIN, J. RATCLIFFE, J. GRISETA & C. RISK, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN
CHICAGO. A CITY OF NEIGHBORHOODS (Chicago Bar Association 1978); J. Klein, Eviction
Court in Chicago: Judgment Landlord (1978) (videotape).
39. Mediation processes stress negotiation of differences that caused the dispute.
Mediators act to facilitate negotiations between the parties. Arbitration imposes a binding
settlement on the parties. Technically, the two processes are quite distinct but many
programs used a combined "med-arb" model, using mediation and arbitration techniques
simultaneously.
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NJCs focus on "minor" citizen disputes, leaving more serious matters
to conventional legal processes. Disputes among citizens, as well as those
involving private corporations, comprise the bulk of the caseload. Some
NJCs are experimenting with disputes involving governmental agencies,
such as public housing authorities. The range of disputes is quite broad,
including both civil and criminal matters. On the civil side, much of the
activity involves housing issues: disputes over security deposits, rent,
condition of the premises, tenant behavior, and squabbles between
neighbors. Other civil matters handled at the NJCs include consumer and
domestic problems. On the criminal side, NJCs resolve a variety of
misdemeanors such as assaults, harassments and disorderliness. In
addition, NJCs have successfully mediated certain types of felonies.40
NJCs may offer promising alternatives to present methods of
processing housing diputes. First, they are immediately accessible to both
landlords and tenants. Problems can be dealt with before escalating to a
point where demolition or eviction are inevitable. 41
Second, dispute resolution can occur with maximum flexibility to
accommodate the parties' conflicting needs. In an atmosphere void of
eviction and building code violation threats, the likelihood of negotiation
of mutually agreeable outcomes increases. Third, NJCs earning
credibility among both landlords and tenants may actually contribute to
the alleviation of class tensions, thereby impeding the development of
broader solutions to a neighborhood's housing problems.
Finally, NJCs could become a focal point for channeling housing
resources where they are most needed. The resolution of many land-
lord-tenant disputes could be facilitated by the availability of
management and/or tenant counseling and financial assistance. These
resources are available but not accessible in the present context of
judicial housing dispute resolution because of organizational barriers
and jurisdictional limitations.
Efforts are currently underway in Chicago, and several other cities, to
develop NJC programs as alternatives to judicial housing dispute
resolution. It is too early, however, to gauge the longterm impact of
these efforts."
40. E.g., weapons assaults between persons who know each other and statutory rape
cases.
41. Adjustments can be negotiated before a building deteriorates irreversibly or before a
controversy between landlord and tenant becomes hopelessly deadlocked.
42. J. KLEIN, J. RATCLIFFE, J. GRISETA & C. Risx, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CHICAGO, A
CITY OF NEIGHBORHOODS (Chicago Bar Association 1978); J. Klein, Neighborhood Justice
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III. CONCLUSION
Analysis of Chicago's resolution of housing disputes provides an
excellent case study of the inadequacies of substantive law and formal
legal procedures as the sole basis for understanding policy outcomes.
Wider citizen understanding of the importance of other variables may
not only lessen cynicism about courts but also may provide a catalyst for
finding a meaningful role for law in solutions to pressing socio-economic
problems such as housing.
in Chicago: An Alternative to the Court System (1978) (videotape). The impact can be
examined by addressing the following questions:
First, what impact do alternatives have on the parties to disputes? Do both landlords and
tenants perceive greater fairness or justice in the resolution of their disputes? Do the
processes used in alternatives like the NJC conform with our sense of due process or
fairness?
Second, what impact do alternatives have on the community? Do community residents
perceive greater opportunities for stabilizing and improving neighborhood housing? Is
there any measurable impact on the quality of housing? Are neighborhood tensions be-
tween landlords and tenants alleviated in some sense?
Third, what impact do alternatives have on the conventional urban justice system? Does
a net reduction in caseload result in both the housing court and the eviction court or other
courts adjudicated housing related disputes? Can improvements in the performance of the
legal system be traced to such reductions?
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